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A FLIGHT PLAN TOWARDS FINANCIAL STABILITY-THE
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
RESTRICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
AVIATION INDUSTRY
BImAL PATEL*
T HE AMERICAN AVIATION industry is a curious paradox.
On the one hand, since deregulation, certain aspects of the
industry are relatively laissez faire. For example, entry into the
domestic U.S. aviation market is freely allowed, provided only
that a proposing carrier can prove financial and safety fitness
and U.S. ownership. On the other hand, even following deregu-
lation, the industry remains very highly regulated in many as-
pects of its business. One area where this paradox is apparent is
in the debate regarding foreign ownership and control of air-
lines in the United States and the European Union ("EU").
Most recently, European negotiators have insisted upon the re-
laxation of current foreign ownership restrictions in the United
States, making it almost (but not quite) a prerequisite for an
open skies agreement' between the United States and the EU.
An open skies agreement between two parties is the epitome
of a liberalized industry, particularly impressive given the impor-
tance of the international context.' However, the reluctance of
* Mr. Patel is an associate with O'Melveny & Myers LLP; Stanford University
(B.A.), John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (M.P.P.),
and Georgetown University Law Center (J.D.). Mr. Patel has worked on
international, regulatory, and antitrust issues for multiple U.S. airlines as well as
the U.S. Department of Justice. The author wishes to thank Messrs. Allan
Mendelsohn and Warren Dean for their insights during the editing and
publication of this paper.
I An open skies agreement is a bilateral or multilateral air transport agreement
that opens markets, eliminates capacity restrictions, promotes competition, and
allows air tariffs to be determined by market forces. Open skies agreements are
based upon the model open skies text, which can be found at http://Nww.state.
gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2008/19514.htm.
2 Recent open skies agreements have provided for an unprecedented level of
liberalization. For example, the recently concluded bilateral agreement between
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the United States to relax the ownership and control restrictions
indicates exactly how regulated the industry still remains. This
paper will explore whether the United States should relax its
restrictions on foreign ownership of U.S. airlines. The first sec-
tion will outline the history of foreign ownership restrictions in
the U.S. airline industry from 1926 to the present. The second
section will outline the history of ownership restrictions in the
European airline industry. The third section will outline the le-
gal and economic arguments in favor of, and against, relaxing
the restrictions. The fourth section will outline the arguments
in favor of, and against, relaxing the restrictions with respect to
defense and national security. The discussion in the last section
will center on the mechanics and function of the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet ("CRAF") program in the United States. As a compara-
tive point, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
("VISA"), a parallel program that applies in the maritime con-
text, will be discussed to extract principles which could be ap-
plied to the aviation context. To conclude, this analysis
indicates that on balance and in the aggregate, the United
States should liberalize its foreign ownership restrictions.
I. HISTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL RESTRICTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. STATUTORY HISTORY
In 2001, private investors owned 166 of the world's 984 air-
lines.' But foreign ownership restrictions persisted in many
countries around the world, with some of the most restrictive
found in the United States.4 Initially, in the 1920s, Congress
limited foreign investment in U.S. air carriers mainly for na-
tional security purposes. 5 Particularly, Congress feared that Ger-
man investment in U.S. airlines would give Germany the
the United Kingdom and Singapore provides for unlimited fifth freedom rights,
as well as cabotage rights within the U.K. for Singaporean carriers. Ven
Sreenivasan, Skies Open for SIA Flights to Britain and Beyond; Unfettered Flying Rights
for Singapore Carriers Include Bases in UK, Trans-Atlantic Route, Bus. TIMES (Sing.),
Oct. 4, 2007.
3 ISABELLE LELIEUR, LAW AND POLICY OF SUBSTANTIAL OWNERSHIP AND EFFECTIVE
CONTROL OF AIRLINES 31 (2003).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 32.
488
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS
opportunity to use aircrafts as instruments of war.6 In addition,
Congress wanted to ensure that only U.S. citizens received bene-
fits accruing from the carriage of mail (the initial purpose of
commercial aviation). 7 This led to the passage of the 1926 Air
Commerce Act' which stated that aircraft could only be regis-
tered in the United States if owned by U.S. citizens, and further
required that U.S. citizens have fifty-one percent voting interests
in U.S. carriers and comprise two-thirds of the membership of
the boards of directors.9
During the Depression years that followed, America often
chose protectionism as its principal means of strengthening the
American economy.1 ° The aviation industry was no exception to
this general principle, and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 19381
increased the minimum required percentage of voting equity
held by U.S. citizens from fifty-one percent to seventy-five per-
cent 12 (note this provision paralleled the Shipping Act of 1916'
which already had a seventy-five percent requirement)." The
1938 Act was followed by the Federal Aviation Act of 195815 (re-
enacted into the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,) 16 which spe-
cifically set out the definition of "citizen of the United States" as:
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States;
(B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual who is
a citizen of the United States; or
(C) a corporation or association organized under the laws of
the United States or a State, the District of Columbia, or a
territory or possession of the United States, of which the
president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors
and other managing officers are citizens of the United
States, and in which at least 75 percent of the voting inter-
6 Seth M. Warner, Comment, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabo-
tage Restrictions Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 Am. U. L. REv. 277, 305 (1993).
Id. at 305-06.
8 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568.
9 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 32.
10 Id.
11 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973.
12 52 Stat. at 978, § 1(13)(c).
13 Shipping Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-260, 39 Stat. 728.
14 Kirsten B6hmann, The Ownership and Control Requirement in U.S. and European
Union Air Law and U.S. Maritime Law-Policy; Consideration; Comparison, 66J. AIR L.
& COM. 689, 696 (2001).
15 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
16 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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est is owned or controlled by persons that are citizens of
the United States.' 7
This framework has been only slightly modified by a 2003 revi-
sion to the law which states that the definition of a citizen ex-
pressly requires that a corporation be "under the actual control"
of U.S. citizens."i
B. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION APPLICATION
Having described the law and relevant statutes, the seminal
question is how the law is applied. The most serious problem
with this statutory framework as it stands is that the statute pro-
vides little guidance on the issue of what constitutes effective (or
actual) control under U.S. law.'9 "The issue of control as it re-
lates to the percentage of non-voting shares of an airline that
may be held by foreigners thus remains 'a matter of policy, not
law. ' ' 20 Indeed, this problem of interpretation has been evi-
denced in the historical rulings of the Department of Transpor-
tation ("DOT"), its predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB"), and the courts.2'
1. Application Through the Twentieth Century
Since 1958, the CAB and DOT have applied a "two-pronged"
approach to defining citizenship under the 1958 Federal Avia-
tion Act.22 First, a person or entity must satisfy the ownership
percentages enumerated in the statute to qualify as a U.S. citi-
zen. Second, only those corporations or companies that qualify
as U.S. citizens can exercise actual control over a U.S. carrier.23
From the 1960s until the late 1980s, the DOT applied an "actual
control" test, whereby merely meeting the statutory percentages
was not necessarily sufficient to be considered a U.S. citizen.24
The first case that applied the test was Willye Peter Daetwyler.25
Here, the CAB held that Interamerican did not qualify as a li-
17 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (15) (2000).
18 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (15) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
19 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 33.
20 Id. at 33-34 (quoting Henri Wassenbergh, Towards Global Economic Regulation
of International Air Transportation Through Inter-Regional Bilateralism, 26 ANNALS AIR
& SPACE L. 237, 244 (2001)).
21 Id. at 33.
22 Id. at 35.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Willye Peter Daetwyler, 58 C.A.B. 118 (1971).
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censed U.S. air carrier. 26 Even though Interamerican met the
statutory percentage requirements, the CAB held that:
where an applicant has arranged its affairs so as to meet the bare
minimum requirements set forth in the Act, it is the Board's view
that the transaction must be closely scrutinized and that the ap-
plicant bears the burden of establishing that the substance of the
transaction is such as to be in accordance with the policy, as well
as the literal terms of the specific statutory requirements.
27
The next case in the chronology is Premiere Airlines.28 Similar
to Daetwyler, the CAB held that there was no doubt that Pre-
miere met the statutory percentage requirements. 29 However,
the fact that the founder of Premiere, Joseph Cicippio, had
taken a $2.5 million loan from his Saudi Arabian employer left
him, and Premiere, under foreign control in actuality." Simi-
larly, in Page Avjet, the CAB and DOT determined that foreign-
ers had actual control of the carrier.3
In Page's proposal, the nonvoting stockholders do not have
day-to-day operational control; however, they have the right to
influence many of the crucial decisions of the company. They
have the power to block any proposal by the voting stockholders
for a company consolidation, merger or acquisition. Similarly,
they have the power to dissolve the company and liquidate its
assets. If the nonvoting stockholders disapprove of the way that
the officers and directors conduct the company's affairs, they can
vote for dissolution of the company.32
Although some saw the ultimate outcome of Page Avjet as a
temporary relaxation of the actual control standard, the DOT
dispelled any doubt that it was relaxing standards by its 1987
decision in Intera Arctic Services, Inc.33 There, the DOT held that
" [i] f persons other than U.S. citizens, individually or collectively,
can significantly influence the affairs of [the carrier], it is not a
U.S. citizen. 3 4
26 Id. at 119.
27 Id. at 121.
28 Premiere Airlines, 95 C.A.B. 101 (1982).
29 David T. Arlington, Comment, Liberalization of Restrictions on Foreign Owner-
ship in U.S. Air Carriers: The United States Must Take the First Step in Aviation Global-
ization, 59J. AiR L. & CoM. 133, 146-47 (1993).
30 Id.
31 Page Avjet, 102 C.A.B. 488, 490 (1983).
32 Id. at 491.
33 Intera Arctic Servs., Inc., 1987 DOT Av. LEXIS 337 (Aug. 18, 1987).
34 Id. at 9.
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These decisions carried the day until 1989, when the chang-
ing realities of the world economic climate trumped many de-
cades of protectionist precedent. 5 As Lelieur points out,
"[p]rotecting the nation from its political enemies was no
longer a major concern of the DOT; instead, [the] DOT's focus
shifted to the formation of new economic partnerships to sus-
tain U.S. dominance of international civil aviation. ' 6 Three
cases illustrate this shift: Northwest I,37 U.S. Airways-British Air-
ways 8 and Continental-Air Canada.9
In Northwest I, KLM aimed to make a major investment in the
fourth largest American carrier, Northwest Airlines.4" In its de-
cision regarding KLM's investment in Northwest, the DOT rein-
forced its precedent of being restrictive with respect to foreign
ownership. 4 KLM claimed it would have less than a five percent
voting interest in Northwest, even though it owned over 56.74%
of the equity in a company called "Wings," which was formed to
invest in Northwest.4 2 This led the DOT to conclude: "it is clear
from our precedent that a large share in a carrier's equity poses
citizenship problems, even where the interest does not take the
form of voting stock, particularly if there are other ties to the
foreign entity."43 Likewise, KLM was allowed to name a member
of Wing's board and set up a three-member committee to advise
Northwest on financial affairs.44 For these reasons, the DOT
concluded that this investment would not be permissible under
U.S. law.45
However, DOT reconsidered the Northwest-KLM case at
Northwest's request later in 1991.46 In its reconsideration, the
35 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 36-37.
36 Id. at 37.
37 In re The Acquisition of/by Wings Holdings, Inc., Northwest Airlines, 1989
DOT Av. LEXIS 643 (Sept. 29, 1989) [hereinafter Northwest 1].
38 There was no reported decision in this case as British Airways withdrew its
offer on December 22, 1992. See Arlington, supra note 29, at 133.
39 The DOT did not formally review the Continental-Air Canada transaction.
For further discussion of this case, see Howard E. Kass, Cabotage and Control: Bring-
ing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy into the Jet Age, 26 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 143, 176
(1994).
40 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 37.
41 Arlington, supra note 29, at 152.




46 In re Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1991 DOT Av. LEXIS 55 (Jan. 23, 1991) [here-
inafter Northwest II].
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DOT changed course based upon new economic concerns.47 It
stated that it would now make a distinction between voting and
non-voting equity, and would allow foreign interests to have up
to a forty-nine percent equity stake in a U.S. carrier provided
that it is non-voting.48 Likewise, they allowed KLM to maintain
three members on Northwest's board, saying that the other
twelve members would be sufficient to offset any potential ad-
verse effects.49 However, the DOT did state that the Chairman
must be a U.S. citizen and committee composition would be
carefully scrutinized.5" Ultimately, this decision, obviously
favorable to KLM, paved the way for both an open skies agree-
ment between the United States and the Netherlands5 1 as well as
a pricing, marketing, and strategic joint venture alliance be-
tween the two airlines.
Two other cases attempted to build off of the DOT's decision
in Northwest II: the USAir-British Airways case and the Continental-
Air Canada case. The essential facts of the USAir-British Airways
case were that British Airways ("BA") was to make a $750 million
investment in USAir in exchange for a total stake of forty-four
percent in the company.52 The most controversial aspect of this
deal, however, was that the USAir board would be expanded
from thirteen members to sixteen members, with four repre-
sentatives from BA, and up to two interlocking directors who
could serve on both boards.53 Although the agreement ulti-
mately failed due to opposition from American Airlines ("AA"),
United Airlines ("UA"), and Delta Airlines ("DL"), there were
indications that the DOT did raise some concerns regarding
ownership and control issues, specifically the fact that BA would
have effective veto power over USAir decisions via BA's board
membership.54
47 Arlington, supra note 29, at 157-58.
48 Id. at 156.
49 Id. at 157.
50 Id.
51 Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles Relating to
Air Transport between the Netherlands Antilles and the United States of
America, July 14, 1998, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr166084.
htm.
52 Arlington, supra note 29, at 159.
53 Id. at 160.
54 Jeff Pelline, British Airways-USAir Deal is Dead, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 1992, at
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USAir-BA certainly met the letter-of-the-law requirements by
having only twenty-one percent of USAir voting stock owned by
BA and one-quarter of the board under BA control. 55 However,
because many corporate decisions required a supermajority
vote, AA, UA and DL argued that BA would have effective con-
trol over the USAir board.56 This concern did enter in to the
DOT's considerations but as Arlington points out, AA, UA, and
DL were able to tie together the issues of foreign ownership and
bilateral liberalization.57 In other words, because the United
States did not have an open skies agreement with the United
Kingdom, U.S. investors would not be able to enjoy reciprocal
investment access to British carriers and, more importantly, U.S.
airlines would not receive access to the U.K. market that
equaled the access that BA would receive to the U.S. market by
virtue of its control of USAir.58
Finally, in the Continental-Air Canada case, the DOT approved
a new financing plan for Continental Airlines in which Air Ca-
nada would invest $235 million and receive 27.5 percent of the
total equity and twenty-four percent of the voting stock of Conti-
nental.59 Air Canada would also be able to select six of Conti-
nental's eighteen board members.6" The DOT approved this
plan exactly two weeks after it had given the indication that it
would not approve the USAir-BA deal because the United States
and Britain could not "agree on steps to permit greater competi-
tion [among] their airlines."61 As Lelieur states, "[b]ecause Air
Canada's partner was a major US investment group and the US-
Canada bilateral was less offensive than the US-UK relationship,
the control prong of the US citizenship test was not violated and
the DOT ultimately approved Air Canada's proposal. 6
2
2. Three Recent Ownership and Control Cases
Just as there was a steady progression towards increased liber-
alization of the DOT's interpretation of actual control, the
events of September 11, 2001 ("9/11") put aviation security
55 Arlington, supra note 29, at 175.
56 Id. at 175-78.
57 Id. at 178-79.
58 Id. at 184-85.
59 Kass, supra note 39, at 176.
- Id.
61 Martin Tolchin, U.S. Approves Financing for Continental Airlines, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1993, at D3.
62 LELIFR, supra note 3, at 38.
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back into the limelight. As mentioned earlier, in 2003 Congress
amended existing legislation to incorporate into the statute the
"actual control" requirement that the DOT had been enforcing
in some form since the 1960s. Three subsequent decisions in
the aftermath of 9/11 cast doubt on what the trend of the
DOT's posture has been on this subject since 9/11. In the first
case, DHL Airways, the DOT, in reviewing the decision of the
administrative law judge ("ALJ"), stated that exercising actual
control over the airline implies having "a substantial ability to
influence the carrier's activities. '6 3 Also, the DOT applied a to-
tality of the circumstances test in determining actual control.6 4
Ultimately, the DOT and the ALJ concluded that the depen-
dence on the DHL network for the large majority of their busi-
ness would not give the DHL (the foreign parent) substantial
influence over ASTAR (the American subsidiary).65 This deci-
sion has been questioned by some commentators, including Le-
lieur, who points out that even during the proceedings,
Deutsche Post (the parent of DHL) announced its intention to
considerably increase its share in the U.S. carrier: "The question
to be raised is whether DHL Airways passed the DOT control
test because of [DHL and its professional advisors'] political
influence."66
The second recent case which sheds uncertainty on the
DOT's current posture in ownership cases is the contentious de-
cision to permit Virgin America to be considered a U.S. citi-
zen.67 In its initial review of the Virgin America case, the DOT
concluded that the limited liability company holding seventy-
five percent of the voting equity in Virgin America, VAI, was it-
self not a U.S. citizen.68 In arriving at this conclusion, the DOT
reasoned that more than forty-nine percent of VAI's total equity
was held by Cayman Island entities or foreign limited partner-
ships (specifically by Sir Richard Branson and the Virgin
Group) .69 One key part of the ownership debate in this case
concerned the existence of hedge funds, comprised of foreign
63 In re The Citizenship of DHL Airways, 2004 DOT Av. LEXIS 404, at *22 (May
13, 2004).
64 Id.
65 Id. at *65.
66 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 34 n.18. In this instance, the ALJ likewise con-
cluded that there was no control.
67 Virgin America Inc., 2007 DOT Av. LEXIS 386 (May 18, 2007) (final order).
68 Id. at *1.
69 Virgin America, Inc., 2007 DOT Av. LEXIS 237, at *50 (Mar. 20, 2007) (or-
der to show cause).
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investors, which owned a large share of VAI (even though the
two hedge funds involved, Black Canyon and Cyrus, were both
U.S. citizens).70
Between the initial denial and the tentative approval of its ap-
plication, Virgin America offered assurances to the DOT that
the foreign investors in these hedge funds would be totally ex-
cluded from investing in Virgin America.7 The DOT, in its or-
der to show cause, then mandated that:
[A]Ill non-U.S. investors in VAI must be completely walled off
from investment in Virgin America. To the degree that such for-
eign interests maintain investments in the hedge funds, those in-
terests must be limited to investments unrelated to Virgin
America, and they may not receive benefits from the investment
in Virgin America.72
Ultimately, the DOT tentatively approved the new format of the
Virgin transaction because it required that the equity held by
the Virgin Group be placed in an irrevocable voting trust subject
to strict conditions, and also because Virgin agreed to the afore-
mentioned walling off of foreign investors within the hedge
funds.73 With respect to actual control, in its initial determina-
tion, the DOT found:
[B]ecause certain of Virgin America's agreements that predated
U.S. investment (including its aircraft lease agreements with
Airbus and GECAS, entered into and negotiated by the Virgin
Group prior to VAI's involvement) remained in place, and be-
cause the terms and conditions of these agreement [sic] did not
appear to provide the U.S. investors the ability to alter indepen-
dently or revise these agreements, Virgin Group appeared to
have a degree of influence over the applicant that, given the to-
tality of circumstances then presented to us, suggested U.S. citi-
zens were not actually controlling the applicant.74
In response, Virgin America proposed removing the Virgin
Group's "veto power over pre-existing and future material con-
tracts or capital expenditures and has provided multiple affida-
vits from GECAS, Airbus, and its non-Virgin Group directors
affirming that, in fact, various amendments were made to the
70 Id. at *62.
71 Id. at *122.
72 Id.
73 Id. at *124-*25.
74 Id. at *129.
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applicant's aircraft lease agreements since Virgin America's U.S.
investors joined the company. 75
Virgin America also agreed to replace Fred Reid as CEO
within the first six months of the carrier's operation. 76 Reid was
suspected of having ties too close to the foreign principals of the
Virgin Group.77 It also agreed to remove and replace any other
officer as the DOT required, to permanently relinquish one of
the Virgin Group's board designees, reducing the number from
three to two, and to amend its bylaws to remove the voting pow-
ers from some non-U.S. interests. 7' The DOT had been con-
cerned that the Virgin Group's (a UK citizen) 24.9 percent stake
in Virgin America constituted pervasive control because of the
degree to which the Virgin Group was involved in the carrier's
management.79 Therefore, the removal of Reid and possibly
other officers was a move aimed at allaying these fears. On May
18, 2007, the DOT granted final approval to Virgin America to
begin operations.8 " Following this, on July 11, 2007, the DOT
permitted Virgin America to begin selling tickets.8 " Virgin
America made its inaugural flights on August 8, 2007, with two
flights departing New York and Los Angeles and landing at San
Francisco simultaneously.
82
Finally, the third case involved the reorganization of Hawaiian
Airlines. The structure of the Hawaiian Airlines transaction in-
volved interposing new U.S.-citizen limited liability companies
between that corporation and existing offshore investment enti-
75 Id. at *130 (citations omitted).
76 Ultimately, the DOT allowed Fred Reid to remain with Virgin America as a
consultant for a three month period beyond the six months that he was permit-
ted to remain as CEO. On December 10, 2007, C. David Cush replaced Fred
Reid as CEO. See Press Release, Virgin America Inc., Virgin America Appoints C.
David Cush as Chief Executive Officer (Nov. 26, 2007), available at http://www.
virginamerica.com/va/meetVaPress.do?method=showMeetVa&NavChlmage=
Press.
77 Virgin America, 2007 DOT Av. LEXIS 237, at *132.
78 Id. at *132-*33.
79 Id.
80 Virgin America Inc., 2007 DOT Av. LEXIS 386 (May 18, 2007) (final order).
81 Press Release, Virgin America Inc., Virgin America Gets the Go-ahead for
Ticket Sales (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.virginamerica.com/va/meet
VaPress.do?method=showMeetVa&NavChImage=Press.
82 Press Release, Virgin America Inc., Virgin America Opens for Business (July
19, 2007), available at http://-w.virginamerica.com/va/press/2007/Jul/Vir-
America-First-Day.html.
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ties.83 The U.S. LLCs would hold voting stock in Hawaiian's par-
ent corporation. 4 "Under this arrangement, the U.S. managers
of the existing offshore entities [would] own the voting stock of
each new LLC reflecting a genuine financial interest therein,
while the existing offshore entities [would] own only non-voting
stock in the new LLCs. ' 5 The two key questions about this ap-
proach were whether the U.S. managers would be independent
and not beholden to the offshore entities they manage, and
whether the LLCs would be structured like corporations, rather
than partnerships, so that no single foreign investor could taint
the LLCs as a partner.8 6 Ultimately, the DOT decided to accept
Hawaiian's proposal to "multiply out" the foreign interests in
each investor to reflect the foreign ownership, rather than ex-
amining each entity in the hierarchy separately to determine its
citizenship based on actual control.8 7 In answering both key
questions, the DOT concluded that the foreign interests were
genuinely passive, and that those interests were so highly diffuse
such that no single foreign investor would have more than a
small ownership interest.88
Taken collectively, the DHL, Virgin America, and Hawaiian de-
cisions indicate that the DOT, albeit slowly, may be continuing
its progressively liberal reading of the statutory ownership and
control requirements. This is despite the fact that Congress has
seemingly been unwilling to make statutory modifications to
loosen the ownership and control requirements. Indeed, when
the DOT attempted to circumvent statutory modifications by in-
troducing a notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") to modify
the ownership and control requirements, 89 Congress indicated
its position in a June 22, 2006 letter signed by relevant House
Committee Chairmen and Ranking Members indicating Con-
gress' "strong disapproval of the Department of Transporta-
tion's (DOT) proposed rulemaking."9 Furthermore, prior to
83 See Letter from Karan K Bhatia, Assistant Sec'y for Aviation and Int'l Affairs,







89 Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389 (proposed Nov. 7,
2005).
90 See Letter from James L. Oberstar, et. al. Ranking Democratic Member,
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, to Norman Y. Mineta, Sec'y of Transp. (June
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that, a bill co-sponsored by 190 members of the 108th Congress,
House Bill 4542, indicated that the rulemaking was "contrary to
the plain language of the aviation statutes."'" The NPRM was
withdrawn on December 8, 2006.92 Absent a major DOT effort
to secure the cooperation of Congress, it is unlikely that any ma-
jor statutory or administrative change will occur in the near
future.9"
II. REGULATION IN EUROPE
A. EUROPEAN REGULATORY HISTORY
The history of regulation in Europe is somewhat different
than in the United States, but has been guided by similar goals.
Following World War II, the most important policy goal
throughout Europe was to maintain peace among the individual
nations, which had not happened since the Pax Romana during
the Roman Empire. The method to achieve a more lasting
peace in Europe has been monetary and, to a lesser extent, po-
litical integration. Within the context of aviation, major devel-
opments began to occur in the 1980s and early 1990s with the
passage of the Single European Act9 4 in 1986, and the formation
of the Single European Market in 1992. Meanwhile, the
landmark decision from the European Court of Justice in this
area, Nouveilles Frontiere,95 applied the European Community
("EC") competition rules, particularly Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty, to air transportation.96 These treaty provisions, and
indeed all provisions of the EC Treaty, could be applied to air
transport even in the absence of an implementing regulation.97
22, 2006), available at https://crewroom.alpa.org/DesktopModules/ALPADocu-
ments/ALPADocumentsView.aspx?itemid=3933&ModuleId=1316&Tabid=256.
91 Foreign Investment in U.S. Air Carriers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
of Jeff Smisek, President, Continental Airlines, Inc.).
92 Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,106 (withdrawn Dec. 8,
2006).
93 Some commentators believe that if the Bush Administration elected to so-
licit the cooperation of Congress and enact foreign ownership and control modi-
fications legislatively rather than through rulemaking, Congress might well allow
the statutory limits to be loosened, especially if accompanied by appropriate la-
bor protective provisions. See Allan I. Mendelsohn, U.S. Aviation Policy-A Cri-
tique, 31 AIR & SPACE L. 309, 309-10 (2006).
94 Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1.
95 Joined Cases 209-213/84, Ministere Public v. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425.
96 ANGELA CHENG-JuI Lu, INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE ALLIANCES: EC COMPETITION
LAw/US ANTITRUST LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 107 (2003).
97 Id.
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Furthermore, they could be enforced to a certain extent by the
Commission and the competition authorities of the Member
States.98 Following this decision in 1986, the Council of Minis-
ters approved two rounds of aviation liberalization within the
Community: the First Package in 1987 and the Second Package
in 1989, "neither of which had a significant impact on the Euro-
pean air services market."99
The Council adopted the Third Package in 1992, which effec-
tively created a completely open market within the EU with re-
spect to airfare approval, routes, and slot access."' 0 For the first
time, this package marked a departure from the traditional sys-
tem of bilateral agreements among Member States.1"' As
B6hmann points out, "[aifter the 'Third Package,' the Euro-
pean regulatory regime no longer distinguishes between domes-
tic or international services within the European Community
market."'' 1 2 Furthermore, as of January 1, 1997, any EU carrier
can operate any scheduled services within the Community, in-
cluding what was previously thought to be cabotage (flights
within one EU nation). ° In practice, however, although air-
lines have tried to establish subsidiaries outside of their home
countries by virtue of this liberalization within the EC, none of
the major carriers have successfully maintained them.1 °4 Per-
haps the most well-known example was Deutsche BA, a subsidi-
ary of British Airways, which operated mostly flights within
Germany.'0 5 Once Rod Eddington became CEO of BA, how-
ever, Deutsche BA was gradually eliminated, reportedly because
it was not profitable.10 6
B. EUROPEAN STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
There is debate as to whether the statutory language covering
European restrictions on airline ownership is more restrictive
than such language covering U.S. restrictions. On the one
hand, it seems as though the European regime is more transpar-
98 Id.
99 B6hmann, supra note 14, at 717.
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ent than that of the United States. The seminal regulation that
was part of the Third Package, 2407/92, enumerates the four
fundamental requirements that an applicant for an air carrier
license must satisfy:
1. the principal place of business must be located in the licens-
ing Member State;
2. the main occupation of the carrier must be air
transportation;
3. the holder of the license must be owned and continue to be
owned directly or through a majority ownership of EU
nationals;
4. the holder of the license must at all times be effectively con-
trolled by such EU nationals.'
0 7
First, it is apparent that instead of using the term substantial
ownership, which in this case implies near total ownership, the
European statute requires only "majority ownership," and the
majority may be made up of citizens of one or more EU Member
States. 10 8 Second, unlike its U.S. counterpart, the regulation
goes on to define effective control. 109 Dealing first with the is-
sue of majority ownership, this requirement has been somewhat
clarified by the Commission in its Swissair-Sabena decision, in
which the Belgian government and Swissair entered into an
agreement under which Swissair would take a 49.5 percent total
equity stake in Sabena, the Belgian state airline.110 The Com-
mission did not challenge this transaction, thereby legitimizing
the presence of a non-majority ownership stake by a non-EU
member interest (though Switzerland does have an aviation spe-
cific association agreement whereby Switzerland takes over the
provisions of the internal EU air transport market). 1 ' The
Commission also specifically stated that it is irrelevant whether
the shares of the "majority owner" are held by a single EU na-
tional or by a dispersed group of shareholders so long as they
are all EU nationals and their interests add up to a majority."'
Finally, and in direct contrast to U.S. law, the percentage thresh-
olds in the EU provision are strictly equity thresholds, not voting
thresholds.113 Thus, a forty-nine percent non-EU voting stake in
107 Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 4, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1.
los Id. art. 4(2).
109 Id. art. 2(g).
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an EU carrier alone is not enough to prevent the granting of a
license by a national authority in the EU. Traditionally, the
United States has been more restrictive than the EU in this re-
gard. However, the new U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement states
that a 49.9 percent non-voting interest held by EU nationals in a
U.S. airline would not, by itself, constitute control of that air-
line." 4 In fact, even EU nationals owning a non-voting interest
of fifty percent in a U.S. airline would not be sufficient to consti-
tute control under the new Agreement. "[O]wnership by na-
tionals of a Member State or States of 50 percent or more of the
total equity of a U.S. airline shall not be presumed to constitute
control of that airline. Such ownership shall be considered on a
case-by-case basis."' 1 5
With respect to effective control, the EU provides more de-
tailed guidelines than the United States. However, in practice,
the application may not be very different. Article 2(g) of Regu-
lation 2407/92 defines the considerations for effective control
as:
a relationship constituted by rights, contracts or any other means
which, either separately or jointly and having regard to the con-
siderations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of di-
rectly or indirectly exercising a decisive influence on an
undertaking, in particular by:
(a) the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking;
(b) rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence on
the composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of an under-
taking or otherwise confer a decisive influence on the running
of the business of the undertaking.1 16
The Commission stated that the ultimate goal of air transport
policy is to safeguard the interests of the Community air trans-
port industry.' 17 EU nationals must be able to make final deci-
sions regarding business plans, annual budgets, investments,
and appointments to the boards of directors." 8  Moreover,
B6hmann points out that "effective control is not inevitably
linked [to] majority interest," provided that the minority share-
114 Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the
Parties to the Treaty Establishing the European Community and the European
Community, Annex 4, art. 1(1)(a) (ii), Apr. 2007, available at http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_134/_13420070525enOO040041.pdf.
115 Id. Annex 4, art. 1(1)(b).
116 Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 107, art. 2(g).
117 Commission Decision 95/404, supra note 110; B6hmann, supra note 14, at
722.
118 B6hmann, supra note 14, at 722.
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holders are dispersed. 1 9 Also, the national authority must ex-
amine the possible implications of supermajority voting (as in
the USAir-BA case in the United States) to determine whether
such provisions could lead to a defacto effective control by non-
EU nationals.120
Comparing the approach of Europe with the approach of the
United States, Lelieur believes that the increased transparency
and definition inherent in the European regulations render
those regulations less cumbersome and restrictive to foreign in-
vestment. 21 However, Bohmann reaches a different conclusion.
Both regimes require the licensing authority to determine
whether a foreign interest is able to exercise effective or actual
control in any form, and neither the United States nor the EU
view debt as a relevant factor in determining control. 122 The
biggest difference is the lack of differentiation between voting
equity and non-voting equity by the European regulators.
23
This means Europe would not object to a voting share of forty-
nine percent, even though such a combination would be disal-
lowed by the DOT in the United States.2 4 However, Bdhmann
states that despite this seemingly large divergence,
[t]he crucial factor in determining the ownership status in both
the U.S. and the European system is not the permissible voting
interest, but the actual control situation in the company, namely
who is able to exercise decisive influence on the carrier. In the
vast majority of cases a voting interest of 49% is likely to enable
its holder to exercise such influence, in particular if the rest of
the shares are widely dispersed. Therefore, in those cases, even
with a higher numerical requirement, a foreign voting equity of
49% in a EU carrier would not be permissible. One can there-
fore conclude that the U.S. and the EU system are not as differ-
ent as their numerical ownership requirements facially
suggest.125
Which interpretation is correct? Only further cases will an-
swer this question because these types of cases are relatively new
in the EU. Experience from other industries would lend
credence to Bohmann's view, given the propensity of Europe to
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 41.
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protect its own corporations from global competition. A recent
example of this protective behavior occurred when PepsiCo an-
nounced that it intended to engage in a hostile takeover of
French company Danone SA. 2 The French government aimed
to stop the takeover by claiming that the recipe for Danone's
yogurt was a strategic asset.127 In reality, however, it appears the
French government wanted to do nothing more than protect
one of the French "national champion" companies that is large
enough to compete with U.S. and Asian counterparts. 12 This
example illustrates that, despite the fact that Europe has consist-
ently cast the United States as protectionist in aviation and other
industries, Europe has a history and penchant for protectionism
that may well be carried over into aviation if Europeans deem it
necessary.
C. 2002 EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION AND THE
ONGOING DEBATE OVER RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT
Adding to the uncertainty is the November 2002 decision of
the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ") with respect to the legal-
ity of the bilateral open skies agreements that have been negoti-
ated between the United States and individual Member States of
the European Union.12 9 The ECJ did not render the individual
bilateral agreements with the United States invalid.' 3 ° The court
did, however, rule that four particular types of provisions con-
tained within the bilateral open skies agreements were contrary
to EU law.' 3 ' Among these were provisions that "reserved the
right to grant permission under the . . . agreements only to air-
lines substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals
of the EU Member States that are party to a particular [bilat-
eral] agreement." '132 Hence, under the old regime, the U.S.-
Belgium bilateral could have stipulated, as it did, that only carri-
ers that are substantially owned and effectively controlled by citi-
zens of Belgium (and the United States) could enjoy the
benefits of the open skies agreement. As all the bilateral open
126 Mark Landler & Paul Meddler, Unity in the European Market, Except When it
Comes to Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Case C-466/98, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9427.
130 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Decision of the European Court of Justice on Open






skies agreements of that era contained such a specific national
ownership requirement, the ECJ's conclusion that all such provi-
sions are contrary to EU law was of major significance. The
main issue is whether this type of provision would be contrary to
Article 52 of the EC Treaty by not according to all EU nationals
the treatment that the Member States accorded to their own na-
tionals. 3 Therefore, as Abeyratne points out:
The court followed its argument that Community airlines may
always be excluded from the benefit of the air transport agree-
ment between an EU Member State and the United States while
that benefit is assured to airlines of that State. Consequently,
Community airlines suffer discrimination which prevents them
from benefiting from the treatment which the host Member
State accords to its own nationals. Contrary to what a respondent
State of the EU may maintain, the court found that the direct
source of that discrimination was not the possible conduct of the
United States, but instead the clause on the ownership and con-
trol of airlines, which specifically acknowledges the right of the
United States to act in that way. 134
Hence, the ECJ held that these provisions were contrary to EU
law. 35
The ECJ concluded that clauses in bilateral agreements that
required ownership and control to be in the designating state or
its nationals were inconsistent with and hence in breach of
Member State obligations under the Treaty of Rome. 136 This
determination created a series of exchanges between the United
States and Europe that could not help but raise questions for
the United States as to European intentions. In response to the
ECJ ruling, the United States proposed a system that would al-
low multi-EU national ownership of any EU member state-desig-
nated airline, provided that the airline has its principal place of
business in the designating state and the designating state main-
tains effective regulatory control over the airline, including issu-
ance of a valid operating license or permit.'37 In response, the
European Commission referred to the U.S. proposal as "mini-
malist" and reiterated that the only permissible interpretation of
the ECJ decision is that Member States should denounce ex-
133 Id. at 491-92.
134 Id. at 501.
135 Id. at 488-89.
136 Id. at 489.
137 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, The USA and the EU-Aviation Relations: An Impasse
or an Opportunity?, 29 AIR & SPACE L. 263, 264 (2004).
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isting bilateral air service agreements with the United States and
move towards a system where the Community speaks with one
voice.138 In fact, in June 2003, the EC did receive a broad man-
date from the EU and Member States to negotiate virtually all
aviation issues with the United States. 139
Even today, it is hard to be certain whether the Commission is
or is not contemplating a very broad definition of the right of
establishment in which a German carrier like Lufthansa would
need to do no more than maintain a ticket office in London to
operate non-stop service between London and New York. Such
a broad reading could be problematic. Nor is it possible to
know how the United States would react to such an interpreta-
tion. Beyond that, it is likewise not possible to predict how the
British government would react to such a proposal. On the sur-
face, it seems difficult to believe that the British government in
this example would not raise an objection to Lufthansa flying
routes that had previously been reserved only for American and
British carriers. It seems that the British government would aim
to protect its carriers as it would do for its firms in any industry.
In practice, recent events show that these concerns may be over-
stated. Air France has begun operating flights between
Heathrow Airport in London and Los Angeles as of April 1,
2008.140 Likewise, BA has begun operations between New York
and Paris (Orly) and will begin operations between New York
and Amsterdam on October 15, 2008.'1 These new services
seem to represent a major advance in the unification efforts of
the EU, although this unification promises to be tested in the
near future as Alitalia faces dissolution and purchase by non-
Italian EU carriers (e.g., Lufthansa, Air France/KLM).142
138 Id.
139 Id. at 268.
140 Press Release, Air France, Delta Air Lines, Sign Trans-AtlanticJoint Venture
Agreement (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://www.airfranceklm-finance.com/
sysmodules/RBS..fichier/admin/forcedownload.phpid=837.
141 See Open Skies, https://www.flyopenskies.com/os/home (last visited Sept.
23, 2008).
142 For a more comprehensive treatment of this debate, see e.g., Allan I. Men-
delsohn, The United States and the European Union in International Aviation, FED.
LAW., 2008, at 36-44; Allan I. Mendelsohn, Myths of InternationalAviation, 68J. AIR
L. & Com. 519, 523-27 (2003); and Mendelsohn, supra note 137.
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III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIBERALIZATION OF
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL RESTRICTIONS
Having described the relevant history and current standards
upon which foreign ownership decisions are made by regulatory
authorities, the larger question is whether the restrictions on
foreign ownership should be relaxed, particularly in the United
States. In analyzing the economic consequences of liberalizing
foreign ownership, it becomes apparent that several parties
would be affected including passengers, employees, suppliers/
contractors, and the airlines themselves.
A. EFFECT ON AIRLINES
Undoubtedly the most significantly affected of the relevant
stakeholders in question are the airlines themselves. The first
and most popular argument made by airlines in support of eas-
ing the restrictions is that doing so would increase their access
to foreign capital.143 Before addressing the importance of this
argument, it must be noted that the airline industry is very
unique in its structure. As Lelieur points out, "[the industry]
suffers from severe business risks [including] high fixed costs,
highly cyclical demands, and intensive competition."144 Due to
this unique business structure, airlines have significant capital
needs. According to a 1990s study, the world's airlines have cap-
ital needs of around $815 billion as compared to $147 billion
ten years ago. 4 5 Undoubtedly, these needs have grown in the
wake of economic downturn and the events of 9/11.
Since 2001, airlines have faced significant financial crises
throughout the world and particularly in the United States.
Four major U.S. airlines have filed for protection under the re-
organization provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (UAL Cor-
poration, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and U.S. Airways),
and many have even asked the government for loan guarantees
before the Air Transport Stabilization Board.'46 More recently,
143 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 69.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 70 n.39.
146 It is necessary to point out that while some of these requests were granted,
particularly very close to September 11, 2001, the last request of United Airlines
before the Board on June 17, 2004, was denied by the Board in large part because
it determined that United had access to other sources of capital, which in some
ways undermines arguments in favor of foreign ownership. See Press Release, Of-
fice of Public Affairs, ATSB Decision on United Air Lines (June 17, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1733.htm.
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four low-cost carriers, ATA Airlines, Skybus Airlines, Aloha Air-
lines, and Frontier Airlines have filed for bankruptcy protection
as well.' 47 This financial difficulty for airlines has not been lim-
ited to the United States. Indeed, two European national flag
carriers, Swissair and Sabena (Belgium), both collapsed in the
fall of 2001.4' Likewise, the same period saw the collapse of
Ansett Australia, the second largest Australian carrier. 149 These
failures led governments around the world to rethink their strat-
egy on foreign ownership. Relaxing foreign ownership restric-
tions would give airlines access to capital that would allow them
to make investments in order to offer more competitive prod-
ucts. Most notably, this was seen in New Zealand (Air New Zea-
land had been an investor in Ansett Australia) where the
government ultimately relaxed foreign ownership restrictions af-
ter a few months of debate. 5 '
In the United Kingdom, signatory to the most restrictive bilat-
eral agreement with the United States, the calls for the relaxa-
tion of foreign ownership restrictions to allow airlines to access
new sources of capital have been voiced perhaps the loudest.151
It is important to note that many observers believe that the U.K.
took this position only to prevent the conclusion of an EU-U.S.
open skies agreement that may have opened access to London's
Heathrow International Airport.'52 The U.K. now seems to be
taking the position that if the U.S. ownership and control laws
are not liberalized within the next few years then the agreement
should be denounced and not be allowed to enter into perma-
nent effect. 53 The United States has presumably been attempt-
ing to allay the fears of the Europeans that Congress would try
147 Trouble in the Air; Airline Mergers, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2008.
148 See Imogen Foulkes, Trial Examines Swissair Collapse, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16,
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6265289.stm; Belgian National Airline
Bankrupt, BBC NEWS, Nov. 7, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1642
507.stm.
149 Terry Cook, Australia's Second Biggest Airline Collapses (Sept. 15, 2001),
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/sep2001/anse-sl5.shtml.
150 The New Zealand Government Relaxes Foreign Ownership Limits in Air New Zea-
land, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, Oct. 1, 2001, at 12.
151 See UK Says Airline Merger and Acquisition Rules Should Be Relaxed, AIRLINE
INDUSTRY INFO., Oct. 3, 2001.
152 See EU-US Land 'Open Skies' Agreement, BBC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/business/4451440.stm.
153 See UK Says Airline Merger and Acquisition Rules Should Be Relaxed, supra note
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to put the agreement into jeopardy (by taking an aggressive
stance against ownership and control liberalization).154
In addition to providing sources of much needed capital, re-
laxation of foreign ownership restrictions would have other ef-
fects on the airlines themselves. First, cross-border investment
would enlist market forces to stabilize an increasingly global in-
dustry. 155 The airline industry is particularly sensitive to re-
gional economic cycles and vulnerable to unpredictable
geopolitical events. Hence, global diversification among airlines
would allow "carriers in one region to broaden their financial
exposure to other regions where growth and demand may be
relatively strong," and thus spread the risk inherent in the indus-
try. 156 In fact, while North America's share of world air traffic is
expected to decline over the next two decades, intra-Asia and
trans-Pacific Asia traffic are expected to grow at double the rate
of North American traffic. 157 Access to foreign capital would al-
low airlines to make investments in new technology, most nota-
bly new-generation aircraft. 158 Thus far, U.S. airlines have not
placed significant orders for either the Airbus A380, A350, or
the Boeing 787 aircraft. 159 Finally, if ownership and control re-
strictions were relaxed, airlines might not be as identifiable with
nationalities, and hence, may be less of a target for terrorism.
Some opponents of relaxing liberalization, such as Continen-
tal Airlines President Jeff Smisek, argue that relaxing such re-
strictions would actually discourage total investment in U.S.
airlines because many liberalization approaches may allow for-
eign investors to hold voting rights disproportionate to their
ownership interests through the presence of super-majority
rights. 6 ° In such a case, Smisek argues that although liberaliz-
ing foreign ownership restrictions may increase U.S. airlines' ac-
cess to foreign capital, this increase would be offset by a
reduction in domestic capital. 6' This reduction in domestic
capital may occur if foreign investors are allowed to use super-
majority rights to exercise control of U.S. carriers that is dispro-
154 See Madhu Unnikrishnan, Proposed Ownership Rule Changes "Unnecessary," Avx-
ATION DAILY, JUly 19, 2007, at 1.
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portionate to the foreign equity interests.1 62 One such example
is the DOT's proposed rulemaking referenced earlier,' 63 which
essentially sets out to create a dual class structure that would
differentiate the control rights from proportional share owner-
ship. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York
Stock Exchange, courts, and shareholders all view dual class
shares with some degree of skepticism, so this may be a negative
consequence of liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions. In
practice, this concern might be overstated by Smisek because
the DOT appears to review super-majority rights, and other con-
trol mechanisms, carefully when analyzing airline ownership
structures (e.g., Virgin America).
Opponents of relaxing the restrictions, from the point of view
of the airlines, also point to potentially large operational costs
and a potential loss of traffic rights. With respect to operational
costs, because eighty-five percent of an airline's cost structure is
fixed to its schedule, 164 the cost of trying to consolidate sched-
ules among carriers as a result of foreign investment might be
very expensive. While consolidation is not a necessary conse-
quence of liberalization of foreign ownership restrictions, often
times, foreigners who invest capital into U.S. airlines do so in
hopes of being able to influence the operations of the U.S. car-
rier (particularly if the foreign source of capital is a foreign air-
line). Thus, for example, if Lufthansa were to invest in United,
Lufthansa may use the influence gained from its investment in
United to seek consolidation of common routes to eliminate ex-
cess capacity. This type of arrangement would be very beneficial
to both carriers, and to the extent that liberalizing foreign own-
ership restrictions could engender these arrangements, consoli-
dation could certainly result. Although Lufthansa recently
purchased a nineteen percent stake in JetBlue, this purchase
raises fewer consolidation concerns because Lufthansa and Jet-
Blue do not overlap on routes the way United and Lufthansa
do.165 The other potential operational cost stems from the daily
consequences of internal operation; however, consolidation
would allow airlines to focus resources on the most profitable
162 Id. at 20.
163 See Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389 (Nov. 7, 2005).
164 Kevin O'Toole, Making Mergers Work, AIRLINE Bus., June 4, 2001, at 110.
165 Press Release, JetBlue, Lufthansa to Make Equity Investment in JetBlue;





routes and, in the long run, airlines would establish schedules to
maximize profitability with or without foreign investment. It is
unclear how foreign investment would exacerbate these daily
consequences; thus, they are far from a foregone conclusion.
Shifting to the potential loss of traffic rights, the problem is
illustrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that there are
three countries: A, B and C. A liberalizes its foreign ownership
restrictions. Suppose then that the airline of country B buys the
airline of country A. This allows the airline of country B to use
the traffic rights of country A that country A had previously ne-
gotiated with country C. The problem is that country C had not
negotiated rights with country B. There may be reasons why
country C would not want country B to have these rights. Coun-
try C could then respond by terminating the previously negoti-
ated agreement with country A. This situation actually occurred
upon British Airways' purchase of the French airline, Air
Libert. 166 When this occurred, the Moroccan government im-
posed guarantees on the French government to ensure that the
traffic rights that Air Libert6 had possessed between France and
Morocco would be maintained.1 67 Absent these guarantees, the
traffic rights between France and Morocco could have been lost,
illustrating an instance under which foreign ownership could
lead to a loss of traffic rights.
The other interesting possibility that arises with respect to
traffic rights and the liberalization of foreign ownership restric-
tions is the possibility of allowing cabotage. The argument is
made that by liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions, cabo-
tage restrictions would become essentially meaningless because
non-citizens could gain access to domestic markets by investing
in the domestic carrier, or through the right of establishment of
a U.S. subsidiary. Though there are reasons why this access to
the U.S. domestic market may not have a significant impact (e.g.,
key business airports such as Ronald Reagan Washington, New
York LaGuardia, Chicago O'Hare, etc., are slot constrained, lim-
iting new entries; the U.S. market is incredibly competitive; and
the profitability of U.S. domestic routes is far lower than interna-
tional routes' profitability), liberalizing foreign ownership re-
strictions by purchase or through the right of establishment
would clearly allow cabotage, and thus possibly change the do-
mestic U.S. aviation industry dramatically. On balance, there is
166 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 77.
167 Id.
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little doubt that airlines would stand to benefit a great deal from
the relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions.
B. EFFECTS ON CONSUMERS
Looking at the effects on consumers, the first question is
whether liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions would have
an impact on the way liability is determined. In the past seventy
years, aviation liability in cases of delay or accidents has been
determined under the original Warsaw system.16 More re-
cently, the Montreal 1999 update169 to the Warsaw Convention
has begun to replace the Warsaw system. Because these docu-
ments constitute an independent international system, the lia-
bility regime would remain unchanged under a system of
foreign ownership. However, Lelieur points out the concern
that if a carrier is owned by nationals who are not citizens of the
designating country, it may be difficult from a safety standpoint
for the designating government to demonstrate its technical
competency. 7 ' This concern is small because ultimately, the
state of registration of the aircraft will be responsible for ad-
dressing its oversight and technical defects, so foreign owner-
ship is unlikely to have any impact from the standpoint of
liability. 171
The uncertainty arising from the debate between the EU and
the United States with respect to the right of establishment may
raise some safety concerns. The designating country exercises
oversight over safety of airlines. 172 No one doubts that if BA
starts operating Paris to New York, the French presumably will
not question its safety. But if Olympic Airways were to start
flights from Paris to New York, would it be the French govern-
ment or the Greek government which would exercise oversight
over safety in that case? To date, no commentator has proposed
an answer to this question, which could have significant impacts
on consumers if safety concerns are not adequately addressed.
168 The Warsaw system is composed of eight private international air law instru-
ments including most notably: Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11.
169 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL33292734.




The other possible avenue through which consumers stand to
be affected by foreign ownership liberalization is potential
changes in fares and service levels. On the one hand, the first
suspected consequence of allowing greater foreign investment
in airlines is that doing so may lead to further consolidation in
the airline industry. Ignoring the overall effects of such consoli-
dation, and limiting the present inquiry to consumer welfare for
now, the exact impact of consolidation is unclear. Consolida-
tion could give rise to unilateral effects if new entities come to
dominate certain routes following consolidation (e.g., Washing-
ton-Frankfurt where Lufthansa was allowed to commit a larger
capital infusion into its current alliance partner United Air-
lines). Also, even absent unilateral effects, the potential exists
for carriers to reduce consumer welfare through coordinated in-
teraction such as joint pricing. Thus, consolidation engendered
by foreign ownership and control restriction liberalization could
adversely impact consumers through increased fares or de-
creased service levels.
In practice, competition authorities have aimed to mitigate
the potential for abuse in these situations (e.g., the DOT's carve-
out requirements in hub-to-hub markets as a condition for the
grant of antitrust immunity). 73 Even given these potential ad-
verse effects, however, consumers also stand to gain many effi-
ciencies from consolidation that could arise from foreign
ownership. Included are demand side efficiencies (e.g., coordi-
nated baggage handling, frequent flyer programs, and sched-
ules), pricing efficiencies (e.g., cross-border investment allowing
airlines to become stronger and offer lower fares), and cost side
efficiencies (e.g., economies of scale). 7 4 Opponents of foreign
ownership liberalization contend that international airline alli-
ances that possess significant antitrust immunity such as
Skyteam or the Star Alliance already accomplish these goals.
However, deeper integration through foreign ownership would
173 When alliance partner airlines apply to the DOT for antitrust immunity
with respect to setting fares, the DOT often grants such immunity, with the ex-
ception of hub-to-hub routes where the only nonstop service that is provided
between two cities is provided by the airlines seeking the coordinated pricing
authority. Although, interestingly, the DOT and the DOJ differ on whether city
pairs involving New York should be subject to carve-out in any circumstance,
given that New York can generate substantial feed without being subject to domi-
nation. Joint Application of Delta Airlines, Inc., Docket OST-95-618 (June 14,
1996), available at http://docketsinfo.dot.gov/general/orders/19962qtr/19962
qtr.html.
174 See LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 64-65.
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allow greater gains (i.e., it would be easier to exploit economies
of scale with the deeper integration of ownership). It is difficult
to say which effects will dominate in the long run and what the
impact of foreign ownership liberalization may be on consumer
welfare. However, if history is any guide, when privatization and
international liberalization have occurred in other industries,
such as the energy and telecommunications sectors, prices have
generally declined and quality of service has improved.1 5
C. EFFECTS ON AIRLINE EMPLOYEES
The next group whose potential welfare may be affected by
foreign ownership liberalization is airline employees. Tradition-
ally, employees have strongly opposed foreign ownership liberal-
ization because liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions could
impose two broad categories of costs on airline employees. 176
One is a reduction in employment levels, and the other is the
"cost" of integrating into a new firm and labor force. 177 The Air
Line Pilots Association ("ALPA") has attempted to enumerate
these costs.'78 With respect to the first, ALPA points out that
increased foreign capital in U.S. carriers may lead to consolida-
tion as described earlier, and that aircraft operating the long
haul routes would all have foreign crews and force U.S. carriers
to cut their international schedules.1 7 Thus, the most likely
place where U.S. carriers may cut schedules is in international
service. 180 ALPA suggests that cuts in international service
would be the most devastating for its members because these are
the routes that pilots covet as a result of being able, first, to earn
more money flying larger, widebody aircraft and second, to
more easily satisfy their flying requirements on longer haul
flights.'8 '
Compelling as that argument may be, opponents to that posi-
tion counter that with essentially free entry existing in the do-
mestic market, airlines have sought to expand international
service because it represents the best opportunity for profit.
Thus, on the surface, it is unlikely that international services will
175 B6hmann, supra note 14, at 715.
176 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 65-67.
177 Id.







be reduced in large enough proportion to cause significant job
loss even accounting for some crew substitution.1 2
Examining the possibility of consolidation more carefully,
there are essentially two ways in which international service
could be contracted: (1) if a foreign-owned company starts up a
U.S. subsidiary or buys a U.S. carrier; and (2) if a code-sharing
partner, such as Lufthansa, replaces a U.S. carrier such as
United, on long haul routes. As to the first possibility, there are
practical limits to the number ofjobs that could be transferred.
In order to offer service on an international route, an airline
must have bilateral route authority. While this is certainly less of
an obstacle today with the prevalence of open skies agreements,
there are still many jurisdictions that do not have open skies
agreements with the United States. Also, to transfer any route
rights from one U.S. carrier to another would require DOT ap-
proval, and it is possible that the DOT may be hesitant to agree
to a transfer of route rights from a U.S.-owned carrier to the
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign carrier. 83 With respect to the sec-
ond possibility of code sharing and transferring international
routes to the foreign carrier (such as the case where United and
Lufthansa would agree that Lufthansa would operate all long
haul services), international service is simply too profitable to
logically see a domestic U.S. carrier willing to cede its long haul
operations to a foreign code sharing partner. In addition, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") has offered two proposals to
allay the concerns of U.S. labor. First, the ABA has suggested
that any foreign carrier acquiring a U.S. carrier:
ensure that the U.S. airline maintains at least the percentage of
the combined total ASMs [(available seat miles)] operated by
both the U.S. airline and the foreign affiliates between the
United States and any country or region that it had as of a date
six months prior to the announcement of the acquisition. I s4
The second ABA proposal involves protecting collective bar-
gaining rights encouraging, "the U.S. government and the ap-
182 Indeed the recent example of Delta Airlines shifting widebody aircraft away
from domestic U.S. services (mostly Atlanta-Florida) in favor of beginning ser-
vices on nearly fifty new international routes. See Press Release, Delta's Transfor-
mation (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://wiv.delta.com/about-delta/deltas_
transformation.
183 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGREss, AIRLINE COMPETITION-IMPACT
OF CHANGING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CONTROL LIMITS ON U.S. AIRLINES 61-62
(1992).
184 Hearing, supra note 91 (statement of Duane Woerth).
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propriate foreign government(s) ... [to] establish in advance a
legal framework containing fair procedures to regulate labor
representation and collective bargaining on such multinational
airline systems.'1 5 Seemingly, any proposal to liberalize foreign
ownership restrictions will have to include labor protective pro-
visions to be politically feasible.
ALPA also contends that pilots and other workers would suf-
fer job losses because U.S. labor laws do not apply to foreign air
carriers." 6 U.S. air carriers are subject to the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act,'87 originally passed in 1926 and amended in
1936, which provides workers far more protections and collec-
tive bargaining rights than workers are entitled to in many for-
eign jurisdictions (most notably in the airline industry-
Singapore).""' Hence, the argument of ALPA is that, by liberal-
izing foreign ownership restrictions, the U.S. would be inviting a
"race to the bottom" with respect to worker protections because
carriers could get around U.S. labor laws by becoming foreign
and exempt. These arguments may be overstated because a U.S.
carrier acquired by a foreign counterpart will almost certainly
remain a U.S. flag carrier.8 9 Also, because of public image rea-
sons, the provisions of collective bargaining agreements, and
U.S. immigration laws, carriers are unlikely to hire a much
larger percentage of non-native workers than they do today. 190
The second set of potential effects occurs with the difficulties of
integrating into a new firm.' This is particularly true in the
case of an airline because all crew assignments are largely done
on the basis of seniority. 9 2 Further complicating this is the fact
that, with foreign investment, potential cultural differences
would be even greater than in the case of domestic consolida-
tion. Overall, it appears that some airline employees may stand
to lose from liberalization, but the effects may not be nearly as
pronounced as many employee representatives fear.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 182 (2000).
188 Hearing, supra note 91 (statement of Duane Woerth).
189 Retention of U.S. flag status is essential for being able to continue operat-
ing U.S. cabotage. B6hmann, supra note 14, at 690.
190 See LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 66.




D. EFFECTS ON TANGENTIAL STAKEHOLDERS
The last category of relevant stakeholders consists of the indi-
viduals and groups associated tangentially with the airline indus-
try. These arguments are traditional economic multiplier
arguments in the sense that every dollar invested in an airline is
multiplied to determine its actual impact on the economy at
large. For example, if consumers buy airline tickets to travel to a
location, that location's entire economy might be the benefici-
ary of an influx of consumption. Airlines that gain access to for-
eign capital will be able to expand operations where profitable.
Doing so obviously increases the number of people that the air-
line will employ around the country such as ticketing agents,
ramp workers, baggage handlers, etc., but this also has an im-
pact on other employment. With greater air traffic in a particu-
lar city, an airport may see increased demand for retail stores,
restaurants, etc. Furthermore, airports themselves benefit sig-
nificantly from greater traffic because airports earn revenue
from each ticket sold using a particular airport. Restrictions on
foreign ownership negatively affect these interests. If a national
carrier were to go bankrupt due to its inability to access capital,
this could have a disproportionately negative impact on national
tourism.1 93 Also, absent restrictions, airlines could attain the
capital they need to naturally run more efficiently, which bene-
fits travelers, shippers, and the aggregate economy." 4 Indeed,
the former president of the World Travel and Tourism Council
has made calls for the airline sector to be liberalized from its
bilateral straitjacket.'9 5 For these reasons, the pro-growth policy
of liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions would work to ben-
efit the aggregate national economy.
Most commentators believe that because of the tremendous
benefits that airlines would reap, from an economic standpoint
(disregarding security arguments for the moment), liberaliza-
tion is very beneficial in the aggregate when all interested par-
ties are considered collectively even though certain groups, such
as airline employees, may be adversely impacted.
193 See id. at 68.
194 Id.
195 G. Lipman, Multilateral Liberalization-The Travel and Tourism Dimension, 19
AIR & SPACE L. 152, 152 (1994).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
AND CONTROL LIBERALIZATION
Having concluded that foreign ownership liberalization is
likely a net positive from an economic standpoint, the seminal
question is whether the potential security problems and costs
that would arise from liberalization outweigh these benefits.
Particularly in the wake of 9/11 and global terrorism, safety and
security have taken on renewed importance in the foreign own-
ership and control debate. There are two dimensions to con-
sider on these issues-the safety dimension and the national
security dimension.
A. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
Dealing first with safety-related issues, a comparison to mari-
time law and a brief history aids in explaining why aviation safety
would not be threatened by a relaxation of foreign ownership
restrictions. The United States has always had very restrictive
maritime laws-as Bohmann points out:
Vessel registration is governed by the Vessel Documentation Act
of 1980. In order to qualify for a registration, a vessel must be
owned by an individual who is a citizen of the United States or by
an entity, all of whose members are citizens of the United States.
Additionally, for vessels registered in the United States, only 25%
of the unlicensed crew may be non-U.S. citizens, and only U.S.
citizens may serve as high-level crewmembers, such as captains
and officers. 9 '
Because of these stringent requirements, ship owners have
looked to obtain "flags of convenience" to register their ships in
lower cost jurisdictions.197 This allows ship owners to avoid
union labor costs, which can be a significant savings because
crewing costs can be half of a ship's total operational costs. 198 A
second reason flags of convenience are popular is that many
countries, such as Panama and Liberia, do not impose taxes on
commerce that does not occur in the country.'99 This can be a
huge tax savings for ship owners. Finally, flags of convenience
became even more attractive following the 1986 Tax Equity and
Reform Act, which compelled U.S. shareholders of a "controlled
196 Brhmann, supra note 14, at 731.
197 Id.




foreign corporation" to include all of their foreign base-com-
pany shipping income as income for U.S. income tax pur-
poses.200 The original purpose of this measure was to provide
an incentive to shippers to maintain U.S. flags, but in fact it had
the opposite effect.20 1 Subsequently, in the AmericanJobs Crea-
tion Act of 2004, Congress reversed course back to its pre-1986
position 20 2 so that "U.S. owners of foreign-flag ships [can now]
defer current U.S. taxation of operating income that [i]s rein-
vested in shipping assets. These provisions allow[ ] U.S. ship
owners to offset earnings from foreign operations against losses
or investments in domestic operations. ' 20 ' Though some hope
that the change will reverse the decline in U.S. flagships because
it will allow the United States to compete with otherjurisdictions
that allow national-flag carriers to accumulate foreign base com-
pany shipping income tax free, the effect of this provision is far
from certain. The relevant parallel, then, is whether aviation
would experience a similar race towards flags of convenience if
foreign ownership restrictions were relaxed; and if so, would this
have adverse impacts on aviation security (essentially, would
competition inspire a "race to the bottom")?
Lelieur argues that aviation will not suffer a decline in safety
standards if foreign ownership restrictions are relaxed for three
reasons. "First, the aviation and the maritime sectors are quite
different. ' 20 4 The bilateral regime in aviation restricts, and even
prevents, mergers of cross-border airlines.20 5 The DOT closely
examines the links between U.S. carriers and foreign interests
whereas the U.S. Maritime Administration does not seem to be
as concerned about the ownership situation of U.S. vessel opera-
tors that receive federal subsidies.20 6 Also, the aviation sector
has traffic right restrictions which the maritime sector does
not.20 7 Second, through the Chicago Convention 20 ' and the
Standards and Recommended Practices of the International
Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"), aviation has an interna-
200 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(c), 100 Stat. 2085.
201 B6hmann, supra note 14, at 733.
202 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 415, 118 Stat.
1418.
203 B6hmann, supra note 14, at 733.
204 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 83.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 84.
208 Convention Between the United States of America and Other Governments
Respecting International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180.
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tional framework of uniform standards with respect to safety. 2 °9
Aviation retains the requirements that "a carrier's principal
place of business be in the country which designates it; and that
a carrier hold an Operator's Certificate from the country
designating it." '2 10 Lelieur argues that because a clause exists in
model bilateral agreements that allows a country to withdraw a
carrier's operating permit if it fails to comply with international
safety standards, aviation safety would not be endangered by fur-
ther liberalization and relaxation of ownership restrictions.211
Finally, as a matter of evidence, despite the significant financial
difficulties of U.S. carriers in recent years, safety records of U.S.
civil aviation as a whole have improved during this period.212
B. NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Shifting to national security, the discussion regarding the pos-
sible adverse effects of liberalizing foreign ownership restric-
tions centers largely on the impact on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
("CRAP) program which is administered by the Department of
Defense ("DOD") to ensure that, in a time of war, the U.S.
armed forces have the aviation resources necessary to defend
national security.213 After describing the structure of CRAF, a
comparison with the maritime counterpart program, the Volun-
tary Intermodal Sealift Agreement ("VISA"), would again be in-
structive. The DOD established CRAF in 1952 after determining
that military airlift capability was insufficient for all contingen-
cies.214 In full operation, CRAF aircraft would airlift ninety-
three percent of passengers and thirty-seven percent of cargo to
a military operation.21 5 To ensure this capability, the DOD en-
lists the equivalent of 120 Boeing 747-100 cargo planes and 136
209 LELIEUR, supra note 3, at 84.
210 Id. at 85.
211 Id.
212 Having stated this, it is important to acknowledge that many countries
outside of the United States and Western Europe do not meet international
safety standards and that allowing these countries to invest in U.S. carriers may be
problematic. See id. at 82-83. However, the FAA and the DOT will inspect all
U.S. flag carriers regardless of ownership. Id. at 83-84. If there are still safety
concerns, one possibility is to limit foreign investment and control of U.S. carri-
ers to entities from the International Aviation Safety Assessments Program
("IASA"), the International Air Transport Association ("IATA"), or ICAO-ap-
proved countries. This should not be necessary.
213 Id. at 86.
214 Id.




Boeing 747-400 passenger jets. 2 16 In actuality, approximately
forty air carriers participate in the program and have committed
approximately 900 aircraft.2 7
There are three stages of CRAF activation-Stage I is minor
regional conflicts, Stage II is major regional conflicts, and Stage
III is presidentially declared national emergency (which has
never been activated) .218 The benefit to participating carriers is
that it guarantees them the very valuable peacetime business of
the DOD and also enables them to bid by "city pair" (e.g., New
York-Los Angeles) for the business of the rest of the government
through the General Services Administration ("GSA") .2 " The
functioning of these beneficial programs could potentially
trump any other argument made in favor of (or against) liberal-
izing ownership restrictions. In other words, the DOD and GSA
programs may well be so valuable as to alone induce participa-
tion in CRAF by foreigners who either buy control of U.S. air-
lines or establish their own U.S. flag airlines under U.S. law.
The potential argument that liberalizing foreign ownership
restrictions would be adverse to the effective functioning of
CRAF is that the United States would have substantially less lev-
erage over a foreign-owned U.S. carrier relative to an American-
owned U.S. carrier in a case of non-compliance with CRAF obli-
gations. In the case of an American-owned U.S. carrier, the
DOT could revoke the non-compliant carrier's operating certifi-
cate. 221 It could also utilize the Defense Production Act 221 to
seize its aircraft.222 Also, it could sue the corporate officers of
the carrier and members of its board of directors for breach of
contract.223 In contrast, in the case of a foreign owner buying or
creating a U.S. carrier, while all of these statutory remedies
would still be available, it is argued that U.S. action might be
limited due to diplomatic concerns with the national govern-
ments of the foreign owners involved.224 Whether this argu-
ment has merit, it is important that any liberalization be
structured in such a way as to afford the U.S. government at
216 Id.
217 Id. at 7-3.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 7-4. For a more elaborate primer on the functioning of CRAF, see id.
220 Id. at x.
221 Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (as amended
by Exec. Order 10,219 creating CRAF).
222 BRATrLE GROUP, supra note 215, at x.
223 Id. at 7-9.
224 See id.
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least the same amount of control over foreign-owned U.S. carri-
ers as over U.S.-owned carriers.
Perhaps more interesting and difficult than the issue of non-
compliance with CRAF obligations is a potential scenario in
which an independent minded foreign investor decides to buy
or create a U.S. carrier and not join CRAF. While it may be
economically unwise for a foreign investor to ignore the benefits
of the peacetime business of the U.S. government, there are a
few potential solutions to this theoretical possibility. The first is
to allow the DOT to make participation in CRAF a prerequisite
of obtaining an operating license and registering aircraft in the
United States. This suggestion is less than appealing because
free market economic principles dictate that private enterprises
in the United States be given maximum choice in commercial
decisions. Second, the government will always have the ability to
commandeer aircraft. This option is questionable for the same
reason as the first option. Additionally, this could create nega-
tive political consequences with other nations if disputes arose
regarding the fulfillment of CRAF obligations by foreign-owned
carriers. Finally, the DOD could simply buy aircraft. However,
given that the upkeep of the program would cost nearly $3 bil-
lion annually225 and the CRAF resources have only been
deployed on one previous occasion (the Persian Gulf War),226
this seems like an inefficient use of government resources. It is
important to remember that this discussion may, in fact, be
moot because the most likely way in which foreign interests
would enter the U.S. aviation market is by establishing U.S. sub-
sidiaries and voluntarily joining CRAF because of aforemen-
tioned economic incentives of participating in CRAF. 227
Moreover, together with the threat of immediate license revoca-
tion by the DOT in the event of non-compliance with CRAF ob-
ligations, it is doubtful that the U.S. government should have
any real fears with respect to CRAF unavailability.
Adding further credence to the fact that CRAF would not be
adversely impacted by liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions
is evidence from the maritime arena. The DOD essentially al-
lows participation by de facto foreign-owned commercial vessels
in the VISA program, the maritime equivalent of CRAF. 228 VISA
225 Id. at 7-2.
226 Id. at 7-3.
227 Id. at 7-10.
228 Id. at 7-12.
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was established in 1997 and is jointly administered by the DOD
and DOT's Maritime Administration.229 It operates in essen-
tially the same way as CRAF, in a program where, in exchange
for being able to enlist an organic fleet in a time of national
emergency, the U.S. government provides subsidies and prefer-
ence in its shipping to VISA participants.2 30 The 1996 Maritime
Security Act 2 1 provides that Maritime Security Program
("MSP") contracts to operate U.S. flag vessels go to either "Sec-
tion 2" or "documentation" citizens.232 Requirements for a "Sec-
tion 2" citizen include: "incorporation in the United States;" no
more "non-U.S. citizens than would constitute a minority of a
quorum"; the "Chairman and CEO must be U.S. citizens;" and
"U.S. citizens must hold majority ownership. '23 3 The require-
ments for a documentation citizen are the same "except that
there is no U.S. majority ownership" requirement. 234 As almost
all U.S. shipping firms that operate in the foreign trades today
were sold to foreign owners in the late 1990s, these foreign own-
ers sought permission to operate all of their shipping lines as
documentation citizens rather than setting up U.S. citizen in-
termediaries.23 5 Initially led by Maersk, a coalition of foreign
shipping companies has convinced DOD that the effectiveness
of VISA would not be compromised by allowing these compa-
nies to operate as documentation citizens.23 6 General John
Handy stated:
[MSP] provides the security we, as a nation, must have to... go it
alone .... While foreign companies dominate the world mari-
time market, MSP ships sail under the U.S. flag, are crewed by
U.S. mariners, are operated by U.S. companies, and are subject
to U.S. laws .... Currently, MSP comprises both Section 2 and
Documentation Citizens. Both .. .must execute the same con-
tingency contracts with DOD committing vessels to VISA Stage
III and thereby assuring us we will have access to their vessels....
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Maritime Security Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-239, 110 Stat. 3118.
232 BRAT-rLE GROUP, supra note 215, at 7-12.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 7-13.
235 Id.
236 Id.
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As a warfighter, my requirements are met by both Section 2 and
Documentation Citizens.237
Given this clear statement, there can be no doubt that liberaliza-
tion has worked in maritime, and there is no reason why it
ought not also work in aviation provided the proper safeguards
are retained to ensure proper functioning of the CRAF pro-
gram. Furthermore, the economic benefits of remaining loyal
to the program are probably sufficient alone to seriously dis-
courage breach. Hence, unless the DOD has some explanation
not generally known, or unless the DOD wishes publicly to assert
a position on those issues which it has not asserted to date, na-
tional security justifications should not stand in the way of eco-
nomically beneficial ownership liberalization in aviation.
V. CONCLUSION
On balance, liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions ap-
pears to be very beneficial in the aggregate because while some
stakeholders, such as airline employees, could be adversely af-
fected by liberalization, the benefits accruing to other stakehold-
ers, most notably airlines themselves, appear to far outweigh the
losses. Furthermore, to the extent that U.S. employee concerns
are at issue, labor protective provisions could be adopted to
lessen or eliminate the potential losses. Moreover, the U.S. gov-
ernment has enough leverage through economic incentives and
assurances through international safety regulations to allay pos-
sible safety and security concerns. Ultimately, recent cases such
as DHL, Virgin America, and Hawaiian leave unclear the DOT's
precise stance on the issue of effective control and ownership in
the aviation arena. To be sure, the DOT's proposed rulemak-
ing, since abandoned, seems to indicate that the Department
would welcome liberalization and additional sources of capital
for the U.S. airline industry. Though the economic arguments
on balance seem to indicate that relaxing the restrictions on the
foreign ownership of airlines would be beneficial, many in
Washington still remain hesitant, more than likely due to fears
over national security issues. However, the experience in the
maritime arena and the existence of significant economic incen-
tives seem to indicate that these concerns can be more than ade-
quately met if CRAF is managed properly.
2 7 Reauthorization of the Maritime Security Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Armed Sews., 107th Cong. 3 (2002) (statement of General John W. Handy, U.S.
Air Force).
524
2008] FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS 525
It is unclear when or how this debate will resolve itself. In-
deed, now that an agreement has been reached with the Euro-
pean Union concerning a US/EU Open Skies Agreement, the
issue could, once again, fall to the backburner since one of the
main arguments made in favor of easing the restrictions was that
doing so would help to further open skies negotiations with the
Europeans. However, given the current state of the U.S. airline
industry and continuing U.K. demands, this outcome is un-
likely. 23 1 Independent of the European Open Skies deal, the
foreign ownership restrictions should be relaxed because of the
substantial economic benefits that would accrue to U.S.
stakeholders.
238 The U.K. position is that traffic rights could be withdrawn after the Second
Stage, whether unilaterally by an individual Member State or through suspension
of the Agreement as a whole, if U.S. domestic market access through cabotage or
reform of ownership and control laws has not been achieved.
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